Restricting digital sites of dissent: commercial social media and free expression by Hintz, Arne
RESTRICTING DIGITAL SITES OF DISSENT: COMMERCIAL SOCIAL MEDIA AND 
FREE EXPRESSION 
 
 
Abstract 
The widespread use of commercial social media platforms by protesters and activists has 
enhanced protest mobilisation and reporting but it has placed social media providers in the 
intermediary role as facilitators of dissent and has thereby created new challenges. Companies 
like Google and Facebook are increasingly restricting content that is published on or distributed 
through their platforms; they have been subject to obstruction by governments; and their services 
have been at the core of large-scale data collection and surveillance. This article analyses and 
categorises forms of infrastructure-based restrictions on free expression and dissent. It shows 
how private intermediaries have been incorporated into state-led content policies; how they set 
their own standards for legitimate online communication and intervene accordingly; and how 
state-based actions and commercial self-regulation intersect in the specific area of online 
surveillance. Based on a broad review of cases, it situates the role of social media in the wider 
trend of the privatisation of communications policy and the complex interplay between state-
based regulation and commercial rule-making. 
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Introduction 
Communication platforms and alternative media have been crucial sites for protest 
mobilisations, activist discourses, the creation of (counter) public spheres and the distribution of 
dissident information. From leaflets to the alternative press, from community radio to video 
activism, and from Indymedia to Facebook, communication sites have provided key 
infrastructure and have even defined protest and dissent - from Samizdat to ‘sms protests’ to 
‘Twitter revolutions’.  
However, whereas many earlier movements tried to create their own media infrastructure, 
the most recent protest cycle has been characterised by the widespread use of commercial 
platforms. This has allowed broader publics to be involved in alternative discourses, but it has 
also created new challenges and restrictions as it has, for example, given commercial social 
media providers a role in both facilitating and limiting dissent. While companies such as 
Facebook and Twitter have actively supported the use of their platforms by protesters during the 
Arab Spring and similar uprisings, they have increasingly intervened in what can be published 
and have shaped the uses of their sites. This has been due, at least in part, to state pressures that 
restrict and monitor social media, and a regulatory trend that focuses on social media’s role as 
key nodes in communication networks. In addition, Internet companies are developing their own 
rules that limit the range of acceptable content, services, clients and behaviours in accordance 
with their commercial goals.  
This article will analyse new types of limitation placed on free expression and alternative 
discourses, restrictions that originate in a form of infrastructure that is now used predominantly 
for dissident communication. It will focus on the increasingly common practice of social media 
companies in censoring content and monitoring activists, and it will address them from the 
perspectives of both external interventions by the state and the internal logics of commercial 
social media platforms. In addition to the challenges this poses to mediated dissent, as I will 
argue, the role of social media companies demonstrates a shift in governance that assigns private 
intermediaries a greater role in both implementing and formulating rules and regulations. It 
points to emerging policy-making arrangements where public and private actors intersect in the 
regulation of freedom of expression.  
 I will start by discussing social media as enablers of both dissident discourses and state 
control, and root this dichotomy in the social and economic logics of social media. The following 
three sections will address different dimensions of social media control. Through a range of 
examples, they will outline how private intermediaries are incorporated into state-led content 
policies; how they set their own standards for legitimate online communication and intervene 
accordingly; and how state-based actions and commercial self-regulation intersect in the specific 
area of online surveillance. Based on this broad review of cases, I will situate the role of social 
media in the wider trend of a privatisation of communications policy and a complex interplay 
between state-based regulation and commercial rule-making.  
This article is based on research into social media trends and a wide review of current 
media reporting on social media activities and transformations. Furthermore, it draws from 
interviews and document analysis conducted as part of three collaborative research projects that 
are ongoing at the time of writing: ‘Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society: UK State-
Media-Citizen Relations After the Snowden Leaks’; ‘Mapping Global Media Policy’; and 
‘Managing ‘Threats’: Uses of Social Media for Policing Domestic Extremism and Disorder in 
the UK’. Combining these different sources, it explores a variety of material to detail 
contemporary trends in the restriction of dissent on social media platforms. 
The Two Faces of Social Media 
From Indymedia to Twitter, social media and other interactive digital platforms have 
been an important means of activist and dissident communication, and have been used to spread 
alternative information and to organise and mobilise. The Indymedia network which emerged in 
1999 and expanded around the globe over the following years pioneered citizen journalism by 
bringing alternative news to a global audience and by allowing every Internet user to publish 
their stories via its open publishing system and thus to contribute to a user-generated news 
platform (Hintz, 2014). The rise of blogging as a mass phenomenon and the widespread practice 
of ‘citizen witnessing’ (Allan, 2013) of key news events followed in its wake with citizen 
reports, pictures and audiovisual footage complementing and transforming traditional journalistic 
practices. 
 From the SMS protests in Spain and the Philippines in the early 2000s to the alleged 
‘Twitter’- and ‘Facebook-Revolutions’ in Iran in 2009 and Egypt in 2011, and to the more recent 
activities of the Yo Soy 123 movement in Mexico, the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, or the 
Umbrella movement in Hongkong, social media have been widely credited as an important force 
in supporting social and political change (Dencik and Leistert, 2015). As a form of “liberation 
technology”, as Diamond (2010) notes, social media and other ICT applications enable “citizens 
to report news, expose wrong-doing, express opinions, mobilize protest, monitor elections, 
scrutinize government, deepen participation, and expand the horizons of freedom” (p. 70). While 
over-enthusiastic and technologically-deterministic notions of social media ‘revolutions’ have 
increasingly been criticised (Christensen, 2011; Morozov, 2011), many observers maintain that 
digital platforms have been “effective catalysts” (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011, p. 1) for change 
and amplifiers of social movement activism. They have lowered transaction costs for protest 
movements, minimised necessary resources, enabled the creation of forums for free speech and 
for shared social and political criticism, and generated a social space for developing critical 
discourses where an open public sphere did not exist (Haunss, 2015).  
 Beyond the instrumental uses of social media for protest and activism, these 
observations point to the broader democratic and participatory potential of digital platforms 
which have been used for debate and creative peer production, and which have been key 
components of participatory cultures (Benkler, 2006; Jenkins, 2008). Innovations of digital 
culture, such as remixes and mash-ups, have broadened the creative engagement with people’s 
cultural environment and have enhanced interactive potentials (Lessig, 2008). Further, the 
instances of activist and dissident uses of social media demonstrate significant overlaps and 
historical connections with other forms of social movement media (Downing, 2011), alternative 
media (Atton, 2001), community media (Rennie, 2006) and the broader range of ‘our media’ 
(Kidd et al., 2009). On a variety of platforms - from print to radio, and from the Internet to 
cassette tapes - these media have served as channels for dissident information and critical social 
debate. However, and in contrast to many of the more recent social networking platforms, these 
media practices have typically been self-organised and self-managed by civil society groups. 
Social media services like Facebook and Google, on the other hand, are corporate 
platforms that operate under a commercial logic. As Leistert and Rohle (2011) note, their users 
are customers, not citizens. Social media are driven by necessary commercial considerations and 
the imperative of marketization, which means that user expectations for freedom of expression 
and privacy are only accepted as long as they concur with the commercial goals. Social media 
merge aspects of a public and private sphere (Papacharissi, 2010) as they allow people to engage 
in public and often democratic ways, but they do so through the means of a private media 
environment. Similar to “the replacement of the downtown city centre by the shopping mall” 
(Andrejevic, 2012, p. 82), the privatised infrastructure of commercial social media offers a 
confined and controlled space for semi-public interactions, under the conditions of a commercial 
logic. Their architecture, policies and user terms must appeal to a broader public and may 
therefore enable activist uses (Youmans and York, 2012). However, centred around “a complex 
and dynamic set of highly opaque tools for selling advertisements, commodities and data” 
(Leistert, 2015, p. 35-36), their rationale contradicts the goals of many progressive social 
movements. 
With a business model of collecting and analysing user data, social media are a “data 
mine” (Andrejevic, 2012, p. 71) that is at the heart of current surveillance trends, as highlighted 
by the Snowden leaks (Lyon, 2014). Social media platforms track detailed information about 
their users as well as their friends and acquaintances (Trottier and Lyon, 2012). The provision of 
a semi-public sphere of democratic communicative interactions and activist mobilisations aligns 
with this strategy as long as it offers the company increased access to user data and improves 
insights into the preferences, networks and activities of people. Accordingly, Facebook requires 
the use of ‘real names’ rather than pseudonyms and experiments with automatic facial 
recognition, which has led to significant problems for activists and their safety (Youmans and 
York, 2012). In contrast, activist-run non-profit platforms such as Indymedia have refused to 
store and monitor user data and thereby seek to protect the anonymity of their contributors. 
The political economy of social media is marked by the dominant role of a small set of 
companies (Fuchs, 2014; Patelis, 2013) which often cultivate close and friendly interactions with 
the state (Assange, 2014), leading to cooperative and mutually supportive relations between the 
power centres of both Internet business and governance. 
State Interventions: Social Media as an Object of Policing 
 The first area of concern for online dissent that I will address here are state 
interventions into both online content and Internet architecture. From a social movement 
perspective this is a classic source of constraints, whereas from an Internet perspective this may 
be less obvious. After all, many of the key components of the Internet were created “without a 
great deal of governmental or other oversight” (Cerf, 2004, p. 14) and focused on the end-to-end 
principle to empower the edges of the network, i.e. the user, rather than central nodes. 
“Governments of the Industrial World, leave us alone!”, John Perry Barlow famously proclaimed 
in his Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace: “You have no sovereignty where we 
gather” (Barlow, 1996). Cyberspace challenged the law's traditional reliance on territorial 
borders and thus questioned government’s ability to control citizens’ behaviour (Johnson and 
Post, 1996). 
However, gradually such borders have been drawn around the previously borderless 
forms of cyberspace (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006). The ‘Great Firewall of China’ has demonstrated 
that control over major backbones and access points can allow governments to erect a virtual 
fence around a state territory and restrict access to both services and information from outside 
that territory (Deibert et al., 2008; Villeneuve, 2006). The Egyptian government, at the height of 
the Arab Spring uprising in January 2011, proved that Internet access in a country can be 
reduced or even shut down during protest situations, and other governments have applied this 
new capability with increasing frequency and flexibility (Webster, 2011). Inside a country’s 
borders, filtering and blocking certain content has become common practice across the globe 
(Open Net Initiative, 2012). Information that transcends moral, religious or political limits set by 
governments has been blocked, most prominently in the Middle East and Asia, but increasingly 
also in Western countries. For example, the system of ‘Parental Control Filters’ in the UK 
mandates Internet service providers to block a range of different content types deemed 
inappropriate for minors. Once censorship tools are in place, as Deibert (2009, p. 327) notes, “the 
temptation for authorities to employ them (..) for a wide range of ulterior purposes may be 
large.” In countries as diverse as Thailand and Germany, the blocking of child pornography 
quickly led to demands for the filtering of a broader range of content deemed illegitimate (Hintz 
and Milan, 2011).  
Social media services have been subject to wholesale blocking in countries such as 
China, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey, and similar blocks have been discussed by Western 
governments (Deibert et al., 2008; Howard et al., 2011). While threats to national security and 
the preservation of cultural or religious morals serve typical rationales given for such action, 
many blocks have occurred as a direct reaction to protests, uprisings, and criticism of 
governments. They have thus served to protect political authority and mitigate dissidence. In 
many cases, “the targets (victims) are active domestic civic society movements” (Howard et al., 
2011, p. 220).  
 While infrastructure-based restrictions to content and services directly affect the use of 
social media, defamation law and rules against incitement establish further constraints that are 
less immediate but may have serious consequences for the individual and may lead to a chilling 
effect on free expression. Prosecutions against bloggers and social media users for comments 
posted online have risen sharply - in Britain alone, at least 6,000 people a year were investigated 
between 2012 and 2015, in some cases leading to severe sentences (Bloodworth, 2015). These 
investigations concern a variety of offensive comments and hate speech, but definitions of what 
is deemed offensive depend on socio-political contexts. Criticism on social media of Western 
military interventions in the Middle East, for example, has been interpreted as ‘promotion of 
terrorism’ and carried heavy sentences (Greenwald, 2015). Social media commentators on the 
London riots in August 2011 have been sentenced for incitement of violence (Guardian, 2011).  
In many parts of the world, the users and producers of social media content have faced 
physical violence. Several dozen citizen journalists are reported killed every year, and in a 
number of countries they are tortured, ‘disappeared’, beaten or assaulted as a result of their 
online activity (Article 19, 2013). Even where their safety is not under threat, they often suffer 
from a precarious legal situation and do not enjoy the privileges of traditional journalists, such as 
protection against libel charges and the right to protect a source and collect certain types of 
information (Salter, 2009). Outside the realm of commercial services, activists who provide 
communications infrastructure for social movements have been subject to repression and the 
confiscation of equipment (Hintz and Milan, 2011). For example, servers used by the Indymedia 
network were seized by authorities in 2004 (following investigations by the FBI) and in 2005 by 
British police because of alleged incitement to criminal damage (Salter, 2009).  
Social Media Censorship 
Direct intervention by state authorities is increasingly complemented by the application 
of pressure on social media companies to police themselves. For example, Robert Hannigan, 
Director of the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), has called social 
media networks “terrorists’ command and control networks of choice” and singled out Internet 
companies for failing to address the misuse of their platforms by criminals and terrorists 
(Hannigan, 2014). Prime Minister David Cameron added that he would “step up pressure on web 
companies such as Facebook and Twitter to do more to co-operate with the intelligence 
agencies” as they have a “social responsibility” to support governmental goals such as the fight 
against terrorism (Guardian, 2015a).  
While such pressure may coerce social media platforms into stricter self-regulation, 
content interventions by Internet companies are not a new phenomenon and complement the 
regulations and requirements that stem from public policy. Terms of service constitute an 
additional regulatory framework that may go beyond the legality of content and often remains 
sufficiently vague so as to include any number of political or economic concerns. For example, 
rules to prevent ‘indecency’ caused Facebook to censor pictures of breastfeeding mothers, as 
well as cartoons depicting naked people, such as a naked Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden 
(Norton, 2014). Apple deleted an app from its app store that marked US drone strikes on a 
geographic map. The app was not illegal but certainly politically sensitive (Bonnington and 
Ackerman, 2012). Activists and political dissidents have experienced increasingly restrictive 
content policies as Facebook, for example, has discontinued activist pages in the run-up to 
protest events. Despite the platform’s reputation for supporting protests and uprisings in the 
Middle East and elsewhere, it has taken down pages dedicated to anti-capitalist and anti-racist 
causes “as part of a growing effort by Facebook to crack down on the presence of political 
groups on its network” (Dencik, 2014). Activists may also be affected by increasing demands on 
social media to take down graphic content of violence against people, as documenting and 
circulating evidence of state violence has been both a key focus of citizen journalism and an 
important means for social movements to recruit new members to undertake collective action 
(Youmans and York, 2012). 
 Interventions, according to rules laid out in terms of service, take place alongside 
ongoing processes of the algorithmic sorting of content. Most social media companies are 
adapting content feeds automatically according to their users’ preferences and are therefore 
manipulating what users see in their news feeds. Facebook has actively experimented with 
affecting user behaviour regarding a core feature of the democratic system - voting. By providing 
selective information about voting behaviour by a user’s friends, it has created statistically 
significant changes in voting patterns (Sifry, 2014). Changes to Google’s ranking of search 
results can have similar effects as the relevant algorithm has profound implications for the 
visibility of online information. Incorporating the ‘truthfulness’ of an article in the search 
ranking, as was discussed in early 2015, may mean that mainstream narratives and official 
reports are highlighted whereas activist and dissident information which typically questions 
established ‘truths’ are moved down to the less visible search results (Watson, 2015). While 
these practices may not qualify as censorship by Internet companies, they have considerable 
impact on the availability of activist and political information on the web. 
 At the intersection between external interventions into, and internal interventions by, 
Internet companies, measures to report problematic content are sometimes used strategically to 
stifle dissent. For example, the Facebook Report Abuse button which allows users to flag content 
that is deemed inappropriate has been applied to report alleged ‘abuse’ by critical online 
publications, journalists, and activist Facebook groups whose accounts were taken down by 
Facebook as a consequence (Brandom, 2014).  
If terms of service and interactions with both the state and other users can lead to content 
restrictions, so can interactions with other companies. The context of intellectual property 
violations shows how Internet companies have been the recipient and executor of take-down 
requests, as well as participating in the development of non-state rules and practices. Youtube, 
for example, responds to the uploading of potentially copyrighted materials to its platform on the 
basis of agreements with copyright holders. Rather than waiting for a court order, its ContentID 
system detects copyrighted material and acts upon it in the way required by the respective 
agreement, which may mean to take it down or to monetize it. This form of content restriction 
does not focus on dissident and activist content. However the struggle over intellectual property 
has been a prominent theme of digital rights activism. In what has been termed the ‘second 
enclosure’ (Boyle, 2003), informational and immaterial goods have been commodified and 
transformed into markets, leading to “the making of knowledge and information into property” 
(May, 2009, p. 364). As control over ideas and knowledge has become a key economic resource 
and source of power, it affects the content available on social media and the very use of these 
platforms. 
As we have seen, social media and other Internet companies have a gatekeeping function 
that may lead to restrictions on dissident or otherwise controversial content. As the services of 
commercial platforms extend beyond the sharing of information, apps and cultural goods to the 
provision of server space, domain registration and funding, these restrictions may affect the 
broader infrastructure of online communication. In December 2010, companies such as Amazon, 
Apple and Paypal demonstrated their gatekeeping role when they closed services they had 
previously provided for WikiLeaks, depriving this platform of its domain name and other public 
access points, and of access to necessary funds in the middle of a major release (the Cablegate 
leaks). This ‘denial of service’ (Benkler, 2011) demonstrated the significant power of so-called 
‘cloud’ services in allowing and disallowing access to information and in controlling the gates 
that enable Internet users to participate in increasingly cloud-based communication exchanges. 
Further, these actions highlighted the vulnerability of commercial Internet services to political 
interventions, as they coincided with pressure from members of the US political elite, both inside 
and outside government (Benkler, 2011).  
Surveillance and the Social Media ‘Data Mine’ 
The intersections between public and commercial interventions into online dissent are 
particularly prominent in the area of Internet surveillance. As electronic communication has 
vastly increased the capabilities of governments and corporate actors to monitor citizens’ 
interactions, exchanges, locations and movements, targeted forms of surveillance have 
increasingly been replaced by the continuous collection and processing of information on wide 
areas of social life (Braman, 2006). In contemporary ‘surveillance societies’, “all manner of 
everyday activities are recorded, checked, traced and monitored” (Lyon, 2007). This has been 
demonstrated impressively by through revelations by whistleblower Edward Snowden about 
mass surveillance by security agencies such as the NSA and the GCHQ. Programmes such as 
Prism, Tempora, Muscular, Edgehill, Bullrun and Quantumtheory have provided evidence of 
mass surveillance of our social media uses; interception and monitoring of most online and 
phone communication; state-sponsored hacking into telecommunications services; the sabotage 
of security tools; and the compromising of Internet infrastructure (Guardian, 2015b).  
The ‘big data’ generated through social media platforms is at the heart of current 
surveillance trends, as highlighted by the Snowden leaks (Lyon, 2014). As the business model of 
these companies is based on data collection, processing and monetization, it valorises 
surveillance (Cohen, 2008). The “data mine” (Andrejevic, 2012, p. 71) of social media allows for 
the detailed monitoring and analysis of Internet users, including their locations, activities, 
preferences, friends and networks, and political orientations. Applications (such as widgets and 
share buttons) that are included on an increasing number of websites allow the tracing of users 
across the web, both by social media companies and their commercial partners. As social media 
render human connections measurable, information about people is not just inferred from their 
own activities and preferences but also from those of their friends and acquaintances (Trottier 
and Lyon, 2012). Unsurprisingly, Google, Facebook and others have been both at the centre of 
surveillance programmes such as Prism and in the spotlight of debate since the start of the 
revelations. Even before Snowden, Google documented in its Transparency Reports how 
governments use social media to collect information about its users. Google has received 
requests for the data of over 100 different users each day, in the US alone (Google Transparency 
Report, 2014). The contemporary surveillance assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) thus 
consists of complex interactions between state and corporate actors. 
Social media-based intelligence gathering (or SOCMINT) has become an important part 
of police investigations, including those that address activism and protest. Social media feeds are 
searched for keywords and particular ‘threat words’, and are analysed to identify both 
‘organisers’ and ‘influencers’, i.e., those who spread information on protest and dissent across 
social media (Dencik et al., 2015). Even though SOCMINT is typically combined with pre-
existing human intelligence and its analysis requires human intervention and discretion, its 
automated procedures and the core role of algorithms relate to growing concerns about 
algorithmic decision-making (e.g, Kitchin, 2014). It demonstrates how social media have 
become important tools for categorising people along social, economic and political lines, and 
how the marketing and advertising-oriented analysis of social media platforms is complemented 
by law enforcement investigations that inform predictive policing, for example of protests. The 
algorithms and analytical tools used for both purposes - marketing and police intelligence - are 
often the same (Dencik et al., 2015). 
The consequences of social media surveillance have been felt, particularly, in the 
aftermath of ‘social media revolutions’ in the Middle East and elsewhere, where the use of 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube served as a means for the state to identify 
protesters and often put both their activities and their health and lives at risk. As Hofheinz (2011) 
notes about the ‘Green Revolution’ in Iran in 2009, “while people in New York cafés were 
forwarding tweets that gave them the thrilled feeling of partaking in a revolution, Iranian 
conservatives tightened their grip on power using YouTube videos and other Internet evidence to 
identify and arrest opposition activists” (p. 1420). In Iran, Tunisia, Syria and elsewhere, 
authorities have used social media to scrape user data and infect the computers of opposition 
supporters with spying software (Villeneuve, 2012). The Syrian government, at the beginning of 
the uprising in Syria, chose to unblock Facebook, Blogspot, and YouTube, which had been 
blocked since 2007, in order to increase surveillance (Youmans and York, 2012). Protesters in 
some places have quit social media, following arrests based on social media surveillance (Treré, 
2015). Such experiences have raised questions about the ‘sousveillance’ (Mann et al., 2003) role 
of social media in counter-acting state and corporate ‘surveillance’. Moreover, they highlight the 
‘chilling effect’ of surveillance on free speech which undermines critical debate and dissident 
voices. Reports by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and 
Opinion have consistently highlighted the fact that the right to privacy is an essential requirement 
for the realization of the right to freedom of expression (UN General Assembly, 2013).  
Shifts in the Governance of Dissent and Free Expression 
The ways in which social media serve as both objects and agents in the restriction of 
information and communication point us to transformations in the location of information control 
and the governance of communication. They allow us to observe a shift in policymaking and 
regulation towards a larger role for private intermediaries. 
As we can see, social media are sites through which the state enforces regulations, but 
they also formulate and enforce their own rules for acceptable user behaviour. In the area of 
content control, they have created platform-specific policies for accepting and rejecting content, 
which emerge from their commercial goals and are subject, to varying degrees, to influence by 
both user communities and the state. They have thus become a “social media police force” 
(Dencik, 2014) and act as “proxy censors” (Kreimer, 2006, p. 13) that are bound by their own 
commercial logics and political leanings, rather than civil rights and the rule of law. The context 
of communication on social media, and particularly the expression of dissent, is thus marked by 
a “transition from rights to express opinions to the necessity to fit within an often changing and 
intransparent regime of codes of conduct, terms of services and ownership” (Leistert, 2015, p. 
36). Leistert has described this as a transformation from legality to benevolence (p. 36.). 
The theme of surveillance highlights how the business practices of social media lead to 
increased user monitoring for both commercial and state goals. Both the Snowden leaks and 
corporate transparency reports have demonstrated the extent to which private intermediaries, and 
social media in particular, are now at the centre of state efforts to monitor citizens and Internet 
user behaviour. While some of the programmes revealed by Snowden (such as ‘Muscular’) have 
been used to intercept data traffic between the servers of social media companies without the 
latter’s knowledge, the more prominent programmes (such as ‘Prism’ and ‘Tempora’) have 
relied on the knowledge and cooperation of Internet companies and telecommunications 
providers. Some post-Snowden policy changes, such as the USA Freedom Act, have further 
outsourced the collection and storage of data to social media companies, telecommunications 
services and ISPs, and have thereby expanded the intersections and necessary interactions 
between Internet companies and state agencies. As data collection, mining and analysis plays an 
increasing role in contemporary forms of government (Leistert, 2015), social media delivers 
important functions.  
The struggle around intellectual property violations offers particularly useful insights into 
the outsourcing of policy as it focuses largely on interactions between private companies. 
Youtube’s ContentID system, as we saw above, acts upon copyrighted material as a result of 
agreements with copyright holders, rather than in reaction to court orders. Similarly, intellectual 
property owners or their representatives, such as the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA), request ISPs or content providers to take down particular content. Such private sector-
based processes have led to requests to remove, on average, 20-25 million URLs from Google 
searches each month, by summer 2014 (Google Transparency Report, 2014). So-called 
‘Graduated Response’ policies to deter copyright infringement have increasingly included 
business agreements that place both the definition of, and the punishment for, copyright 
violations in the hands of content owners and ISPs. For example, the US Copyright Alert System 
has copyright holders identify shared copyrighted material and ISPs exert punishment by issuing 
a warning to the customer or, as a last resort, by cancelling their Internet connection altogether 
(Flaim, 2012). According to Mueller (2010), “the regulatory trend that constantly emerges from 
the [intellectual property] tension is a shift of the responsibility for monitoring and policing 
Internet conduct onto strategically positioned private sector intermediaries” (p. 149). By 
“delegating responsibility to the private sector”, the state enlists businesses and other non-state 
actors in implementing communications policy and, furthermore, transfers quasi-policy functions 
(p. 149).  
This privatisation of content regulation takes place in the context of broader trends in 
communications policy. Both the spaces and actors of policy-making have expanded over the 
past decades beyond the classic focus on national law and regulation. Developments taking place 
at other levels than the national, and both normative and material influences by a variety of non-
state actors, have increasingly transformed traditional regulatory procedures. National policy has 
thus “become embedded within more expansive sets of interregional relations and networks of 
power” (Held and McGrew, 2003, p. 3), and policy authority is now located at “different and 
sometimes overlapping levels – from the local to the supra-national and global” (Raboy and 
Padovani, 2010, p. 16). Policy fora such as the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) have experimented with new forms of multi-
stakeholder processes that include civil society and the business sector (Hintz, 2009). The main 
Internet governance institution, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), has relegated governments to an advisory function. Thus the vertical, centralized and 
state-based modes of traditional regulation have been complemented by collaborative horizontal 
arrangements, leading to “a complex ecology of interdependent structures” with “a vast array of 
formal and informal mechanisms working across a multiplicity of sites” (Raboy, 2002, p. 6-7). 
Non-state actors - including both civil society networks and companies such as 
commercial social media - have engaged with this complex environment on a variety of levels. 
To start with, they have staged normative interventions into policy debate by setting agendas, 
exerting public pressure, lobbying and public campaigns, and by lending or withdrawing 
legitimacy to policy goals, decisions and processes (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Google has 
invested over $13 million in lobbying activities in 2015 (Open Secrets, 2015). Further, Internet 
companies have changed the communications environment by developing new technologies and 
platforms, and with them new standards, protocols and practices that have become de-facto 
cornerstones of communication technology. As technical standards and protocols typically allow 
some actions and disallow others, and enable some uses and restrict others, their development 
constitutes a latent and invisible form of policymaking (e.g., Braman, 2006; DeNardis, 2009; 
Lessig, 1999). The content standards that social media set through their terms of service and 
rule-making constitute a further set of standards that interacts with public policy and 
international norms and competes with these classic rules.  
Like contemporary global governance, the privatised policy of social media companies 
connects the national with the regional and the global level. Companies are subject to domestic 
state policies and interact with the state through lobbying and various forms of collaboration (as 
described above). They have to comply with the laws and policies of other states and regions 
(such as the European Union) and they interact with global policy fora. Yet their services, and 
thus their specific technological and content standards as well as their data collection practices 
extend, potentially, to a global reach of users across states and regions.  
Finally, the privatisation of communication policy in the form of an increased role for 
commercial intermediaries points to the broader trend of neoliberal restructuring, in which 
political authority and decision-making power are taken out of the public realm and transferred 
to private environments, often underpinned by commercial and market logics (Crouch, 2004).  
Openings and Resistance 
If social media platforms increasingly self-regulate content and user behaviour, in 
accordance with their commercial logics and profit goals, this changes the avenues of protest and 
resistance. While it becomes more difficult to appeal to public policy and human rights, 
campaigns against social media platforms have caused Internet companies to change their terms 
of service and content policies. For example, the #FBrape campaign in 2013 led Facebook to 
moderate posts more rigidly that depict violence against women, as well as other ‘cruel and 
insensitive’ content. Crucially, the campaign had persuaded 15 brands to pull their advertising 
from the social network. Twitter followed soon by establishing anti-harassment tools and 
simplifying reporting processes for abusive tweets (Moyer, 2015).  
Responses by digital rights activists and concerned customers to the Snowden 
revelations, similarly, have led Internet companies to improve user privacy and establish 
encrypted data transfers. US-based companies, in particular, have had to address customer 
concerns regarding data security in the context of NSA spying. Not least, this has created 
divisions between Internet companies and the state and has thus shaken up their previously cosy 
relations (Wizner, 2015). Projects such as ‘Ranking Digital Rights’ 
(https://rankingdigitalrights.org/) have advanced the focus on corporate policies by creating an 
‘Accountability Index’ based on the policies and commitments of Internet and 
telecommunications companies regarding user privacy and freedom of expression. 
Consumer action has thus made use of promising openings. However its limits have lied 
in its ad-hoc nature and its acceptance of the key role of corporate policy, which have left the 
broader issues and implications of privatised policy unaddressed. The response by social media 
companies to campaigns such as #FBrape may be particularly forthcoming if the solutions to the 
problem align with the companies’ commercial self-interest. In this case, Facebook used the 
campaign to establish and justify its real-name policy which, as we have seen, has been 
damaging for many activists and alternative cultures.  
Prefigurative action has taken one step further as a strategy of communications activism 
to address grievances. It shares with the kinds of consumer action mentioned above an approach 
that does not focus on addressing established political venues, but implies a more fundamental 
transformation of both the development of, and the decision-making over, communications 
infrastructure. Prefigurative action in response to issues such as Internet censorship and 
surveillance include the development of technological alternatives that bypass regulatory 
obstacles, and reinforce autonomous and civil society-based media infrastructure. Rather than 
agitating for policy change, many Internet activists see their task as the creation of “self-
managed infrastructures that work regardless of ‘their’ regulation, laws or any other form of 
governance” (Indymedia activist, in Hintz and Milan, 2009, p. 31). Their strategies focus on 
prefigurative action, rather than attempts to influence policy processes they regard as dominated 
by existing powers, and even extend their interventions to ‘policy hacking’ initiatives to develop 
new model laws and regulatory frameworks (Hintz, forthcoming; Hintz and Milan, 2013). In 
their efforts, they thus mirror privatised forms of policy authority and implementation as they 
trust in their own ability to develop solutions to perceived problems, rather than in the abilities of 
public institutions. 
Conclusion 
Social media and other digital platforms have provided an important means of activist 
and dissident communication, but they are also key sites where the tension between free 
communication and the emerging reality of restriction and censorship is played out. As the 
deterritorialised spheres of the Internet have partly been re-territorialised by states, practices of 
filtering and blocking content are expanding, illegalities of content are defined, and digital 
surveillance has become pervasive. Social media companies and other commercial 
intermediaries are subjected to these trends as they are enlisted by the state to police the net, and 
as they are required by governments to monitor their users and store data exchanges. Yet they 
also play an active role in developing and enforcing new rules for allowing as well as restricting 
information; they define and punish objectionable user behaviour; and they provide and 
withdraw, accordingly, vital spaces and resources for communication. Further, they are placed at 
the centre of contemporary ‘surveillance societies’ as their business rationale requires the 
capturing, analysis and monetization of data and the commodification of users. For activists and 
providers of dissident information, the incorporation of social media into restrictive state policies 
and intelligence gathering routines, as well as the practices of intermediaries to set content 
standards and monitor user behaviour, provide a serious challenge and a significant shift as 
platforms used for protest and public debate are transformed into controlled spaces. What was 
regarded as ‘liberation technology’ is progressively enclosed. 
The increasing role of private intermediaries in formulating, implementing and enforcing 
regulatory mechanisms demonstrates, as I have argued, a shift in the governance of speech. This 
shift is marked by the outsourcing of public policy to private actors and thus the privatisation of 
some policy areas. It includes both the establishment of competing policies, for example on 
content regulation, and collaborations between the state and private sectors, for example on 
surveillance. For activism and dissent, the relative weakening of state-based control of 
information has created openings. However the commercial logic of social media platforms and 
their close interactions with, and use by, state agencies has established new challenges.  
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